Below is an abstract for an article that I wrote. It concerns a problem in Dewey's theory of continuity. In short, every situation must be a problematic situation in some sense, else
There is a paradox at the heart of John Dewey's theory of
experience. Every situation both is
and is not a problematic situation.
Experiencing a situation as problematic is a gestalt shift in the continuity
of experience, a reorganization of present and emergent elements, that is not
emergent ex nihilo. Since Deweyan naturalism excludes spontaneous
causality, and continuity implies that everything has a natural history, the
process of a problematic situation must be explained. I will account for the paradox, elucidate the
process, and resolve a conundrum that results.
The conundrum is, why is not every situation experienced as
problematic, when logically every situation is problematic. The explanation includes a synoptic account
of Dewey’s theory of experience that emphasizes its processive character as a
natural history. I will also elucidate
some implications for agency, intentionality, and the gestalt conditions for
problematic experience.
In short, every situation must be a problematic situation in some sense, else a problematic situation emerges ex nihilo. The essay discusses in what way all situations must be "problematic" or contain a "felt difficulty." This has several implications. One, we can only attend to the "problematic" on Dewey's theory. Two, the emergent "problem" is also the genesis of intentionality; the object calls out our attention to it, though "object" does not have the usual denotation. Three, if "mind" is an event founded on a "conscious" event and then upon a bodily one, in what way is this event translated or encoded from environment, body, consciousness, and mind? That is, there is a continuous progression of events; what can be said of the event-structure given a Deweyan framework? I leave it to later work to compare this to contemporary articulations, e.g., Deacon, Varela, etc.
if you get a chance check out Gendlin:
ReplyDeletehttp://www.focusing.org/process.html
Thank you! That is a fantastic reference by the looks of it. I have found relatively few process models of embodiment, because most are either (continental) phenomenological, conceive process as a biological methodology rather than a metaphysical background, etc.
ReplyDeleteIs that you, Dmf, or another un-named wanderer?
yes sorry it's me, dmf
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