The following is a snippet from my book manuscript that is the beginning of the explanation of John Dewey's theory of habit, which undergirds my own phenomenological pragmatism. The habitual body is the primary, proximate source of meaning for human experience.
The essence of habit is an acquired predisposition to ways or modes of response, not to particular acts except as, under special conditions, these express a way of behaving. Habit means special sensitiveness or accessibility to certain classes of stimuli, standing predilictions and aversions, rather than bare recurrence of specific acts (MW 14:32; 143).
"Habit" primarily refers to the capacities of the organism to reconstruct its environment. While the latent structures of the environment and situation have been discussed, the inclusion of the biological phase of habit in organic processes focuses on how the organism actively structures and restructures its environment and thereby the situation. Habits "incorporate an environment within themselves. They are adjustments of the environment, not merely to it" (MW 14:38; 142). Hence, habits are a continual incorporation or embodiment of the environment and are continuous with it. They are not "inner forces," "powers of an autonomous organism," "individual reflexes," "psychic associations," or "repeated actions."[i] They are "structured processes integrating the organism-environment field … general paths of integration and interpretation … situational structures."[ii]