Ain't yo momma's empiricism.
I wish to reveal a fundamental principle of a pragmatic theory of experience as originated in William James and as developed in John Dewey. I perform this as an exercise in clarifying fundamental notions of experience for neophytes to pragmatic phenomenology.
James reversed the standard British/Scottish empiricist view of experience view of the composition of experience. Experience is not first a plenum, a multitude of impressions, ideas, or even sensible manifolds brought into unity. Experience is a unity, a "pure experience," in which distinctions are secondary or derived. Distinctions are acts.
What is the primary unity? Now I transition to Dewey and give a metaphysical-biological answer. The fundamental unity of experience is due to the equilibrium of environmental-organismic interaction. Activity is unity, and the quality of that unity is its equilibrium. Insomuch as our activities within the natural environment are in equilibrium, are homeostatic, experience is a unity, e.g., "pure experience."
Distinction in conscious experience originates from a relative disequilibrium in bodily activity. Contra Kant, we understand "spontaneity" to be an event of resistance, ie., a "tensional" or "problematic" situation. The origin of the phenomenon is not from within consciousness; consciousness is something that happens to a natural event.
What principle am I attempting to impart? 1) Unity is primary over diversity, and there is no traditional problem of synthesis. 2) Unity is understood as a unity of activity, a relatively stable dynamic. Many might agree with 1 but not 2.
This is one of the fundamental differences between a pragmatic phenomenology, i.e., its metaphysical and epistemological realism that is also immediately compatible with experimental science, and typical continental phenomenology.