Wednesday, June 5, 2013

Are There Any Philosophical Problems that Our Age Instantiates?


An interesting passage:

I think to some extent the failure of clinical psychology should have warned us that our age would be haunted by this problem. The whole Freudian myth was that the act of having true beliefs about the causes of your own inability to get your crap together would somehow magically help you get your crap together. What a strange thing to have believed! Now we are seeing the failure of this myth with respect to nearly every aspect of human well-being. It's sort of a collective akrasia not unlikely to be the death knell of our species.

The issue resonates philosophically as well. First, contemporary debates about internalism in ethics just are debates about whether certain beliefs could be magically causally efficacious. Second, much contemporary theology is a move against the idea that metaphysical beliefs (about resurrections and whatnot) can magically fix one's spiritual state (traditional clinical psychology could only have been invented in a Protestant culture steeped in such magical views). Third, this issue is actually the flip side of what John McDowell is worried about in Mind and World. This is no accident, as the Fichtean/Schellingian route through intellectual intuition as an example of something both sensory and conceptual is also the marriage of perception and action.
This is well into the post, and he gives some questioning, tentative prescriptions afterwards.


I haven't bought into the internalist view since I was a young undergraduate, and even then my suspicions were fighting my culturally-granted intuitions. It's not just about those academics who claim to be internalists, but as I suspect readers know that the average American is an internalist whether the person knows what that means or not. With my students, with whom I can discuss this issue at great length, I note that they are usually more worried about their self-image rather than either truth or rational justification of the self-image. In fact, I consider it a triumph for them to grasp the distinction as anything more than an abstraction that has nothing to do with their lives. Sadly, I have met too many intellectuals who are only one step removed, in that they accept the distinction between truth and self-image, yet implicitly replace dyad with narrative of truth and self-image. If truth is to be something that resists our claims upon it, it must be more than a narrative or idea. Sadly, I don't think theory aids us much further on this point, other than important generalities, because practical wisdom cannot be achieved in that way.

This last point is one reason why I tend to be less political than some blogs: because I think some of the most important points cannot be shared semi-anonymously online. I am silent about such things because I don't think words are efficacious, whereas I note many intellectuals garland themselves with words of social justice, etc. Personally, I don't share the typical educated lefty's need to engage in public outpourings of social justice to near the same degree. That said, if I were to do so more often, it would look a lot like Jon Cogburn's piece, which I think is an ideal model.

William Lloyd Garrison on Justice, Ignorance, and Guilt


The white abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison was also a strong proponent of women’s rights. In 1853, he was at a women’s rights convention where a man complained that the Seneca Falls Declaration of Sentiments unfairly impugned men’s character, and a woman conceded that both sexes were to blame for the situation. Garrison responded forcefully, in a way that I think is relevant to contemporary discussions relating to “privilege checking”:

Those who do wrong ignorantly, do not willingly continue in it, when they find they are in the wrong. Ignorance is not an evidence of guilt certainly. It is only an evidence of a want of light. They who are only ignorant, will never rage, and rave, and threaten, and foam, when the light comes; but being interested and walking in the light, will always present a manly front, and be willing to be taught and be willing to be told they are in the wrong.

Take the case of slavery: How has the anti-slavery cause been received? Not argumentatively, not by reason, not by entering the free arena of fair discussion and comparing notes; the arguments have been rotten eggs, and brickbats and calumny, and in the southern portion of the country, a spirit of murder, and threats to cut out the tongues of those who spoke against them. What has this indicated on the part of the nation? What but conscious guilt? Not ignorance, not that they had not the light. They had the light and rejected it.

How has this Woman’s Rights movement been treated in this country, on the right hand and on the left? This nation ridicules and derides this movement, and spits upon it, as fit only to be cast out and trampled underfoot. This is not ignorance. They all know the truth. It is the natural outbreak of tyrrany. It is because the tyrants and usurpers are alarmed. They have been and are called to judgment, and they dread the examination and exposure of their position and character.

Quoted from Schneir, Feminism: The Essential Historical Writings, pp. 88-89.

Monday, June 3, 2013

Why Does France Insist that Students Master Philosophy

From the BBC News Magazine. Go take a look; it's interesting.

Form as Morphological

This is a snippet of something that I've been translating from French for publication. Sadly, it won't come out for years, but this passage expresses what I have been saying about process metaphysics in relation to phenomenology for years.


"In order to do this [respond to the antinomy of structure], I have developed the following ideas.
1.         The semiotic layer of sense is not autonomous. It is rooted partly in the morphological structuring of the natural world and partly in the body itself in perception and action (vision, kinesthesia, proprioception, comportment to ethological sense, etc.).
2.         The dependence of sense on the natural world can only be comprehended if the natural world proceeds from a morphological organization to which we could have, as an animal species, ecologically and ethologically adapted ourselves (in Gibson’s sense) and as an Umwelt. Accessible to animals, one such organization is synthetic, perceptive, dynamic, and morphological in a Gestaltist sense. The theoretical implication is that structural approaches become dependent upon theories of form in a dynamic and morphological sense.

3.         The structural concept of form must be replaced by a genetic concept of form as emergent self-organization. The response to the dialectical antimony of structure is that form is the phenomenon of the organization of matter, which is to say the phenomenon of substance."

"Form" in my sense is "morphological" and temporal. For identity to be temporal, it can only be determined by including a principle of change, of natural development. Elsewhere, the author uses the term "entelechies" just as I do. Hence, and jumping way forward, a conscious experience is a phenomenological semiotic response to a simultaneous underlying natural semiotic.

Well after my dissertation, I wish I had discovered the biosemiotic crowd sooner, where everything that is alien to many philosophers is just taken as a given with that crowd.

CFP: Inter-American Journal of Philosophy



Call for Papers:

Inter-American Journal of Philosophy


IJP seeks to publish articles that focus on past, present and possible future philosophical connections between philosophers and philosophic traditions in different parts of the Americas. For its first issues, IJP is calling for papers on the following topics: 
(1) North American and Latin American Philosophy: the mutual influence of philosophy done in the north and south of the continent, or a fruitful comparison of the philosophical insights of prominent philosophers on both sides. 
(2) Latin American Philosophers on Past and Present Philosophical Traditions: examination and elaboration of the important contributions of philosophers in Latin America to past and present problems in the Analytic and Continental traditions.
(3) Philosophers on the common ideals and common socio-political problems of the Americas.
(a) Democracy: its Nature and its Problems in the Americas
Evaluation of arguments and intellectual tools used by philosophers in the Americas to think and ameliorate the past and present problems that we share as a continent and in light of Democracy as our common ideal. Prominent philosophers across the Americas have agreed that the common threats to democracy are the erosion of communal values and public discourse, poverty, injustice (in the treatment of indigenous populations and immigrants), ignorance, and the lack of civic responsibility. Moreover, philosophers from the Americas have shared a common conception of democracy. For instance, Antonio Caso and John Dewey both conceived of democracy as “a way of life” and not just as a political system.
Are the similarities between American philosophers regarding democratic values worthy of philosophical inquiry? Is there much that the Americas can learn from each other in light of the problems they have encountered in trying to encourage and maintain a democratic way of life. For example: How do our education systems compare with respect to the cultivation of democratic values and virtues? What reforms have been effective? 
(b) How can philosophy contribute to the amelioration of the common problems of North and South America? Examples of these problems are:
1. Immigration, Borders and Human Rights.
2. Drug trafficking and the legal regulation of private practices.
3. Indigenous People, Democracy and the Social Compact.
4. Management and Protection of Natural Resources in the Americas.

(4) Philosophical ideas and debates about the identity of the Americas and their ideal relationship:
This has been the concern of writers and intellectuals in the continent since the 20th century. Some have argued that the cultural and value differences between the Americas is such that one should not be emulating or admiring the other. On the other hand, others have argued that the differences are complementary, and that in order to identify and ameliorate common problems we must eliminate illusory antagonism and prejudices and theorize a more inclusive sense of belonging. 

(5) Philosophy of technology and science: 
The gap or differences in regard to advances in the development of technology and the sciences between the Americas can be the subject of philosophical inquiry. Beyond the socio-economical and historical reasons for these differences, are there substantial differences between the USA and Latin American cultures in regard to the proper function of technology in human life? Are there conflicting views of human nature and human flourishing that underline cultural differences in regard to the value of technology?

(6) Environmental Ethics:
The administration of protection of the natural resources in the Americas.

Sunday, June 2, 2013

New Issue: Inter-American Journal of Philosophy

Announcing new volume and call for papers:

Inter-American Journal of Philosophy
Volume 4, Issue 1 

Taking Economic Social Rights Seriously: A Way to Fight Poverty
by Paulette Dieterlen

Todo a relajo: Jorge Mañach and Metaphysical Rebellion
by Adam Glover

The Philosophical Polemic in Havana Revisited
by Vicente Medina

Art in Inquiry: John Dewey, Soviet Russia, and the Trotsky Commission
by David A. Granger

The Rhetorical Function of Law for the Boundaries of Tolerance
by João Maurício Adeodato

Saturday, June 1, 2013

Reblog: The New Atheism, the Emergent Church: An analysis

Reblogged from An und fur Sich by Adam Kotsko. Aside from personal interest and experience of this phenomenon, this is relevant to the recent discussion of mytho-poesis, religion, and science.

This post is dedicated to @EmergentDudeBro.

I have been known to mock the New Atheism, for example by suggesting that reading Marx will “blow their minds.” My reason for saying this, of course, is that Marx responded to his generation’s equivalent to the New Atheists by pointing out that critiquing religion on the level of “false beliefs” is necessary but not sufficient — indeed, it completely neglects the material conditions that lead people to embrace religion. I have taken Marx’s basic idea in a somewhat different direction, insofar as I have long believed that the real problem with the evangelical Christian communities in which I lived for the first two-thirds of my life was not the opinions they held on various metaphysical issues, but the concrete material strategies that they used to maintain people’s group loyalty. Teenagers, for instance, are subject to intensive emotional manipulation at the time of their life when they are most vulnerable to it. On the one hand, they are made to feel ashamed of their spontaneous bodily urges, and then church participation is put forward as the way to unburden themselves. On the other hand, they are provided with a full range of social activities so that the church will become their primary group of friends — a strategy that is strongly reinforced insofar as the church is presented as the one safe space in an implacably hostile world. (I remember being viscerally afraid to start middle school after all the propaganda I’d been subjected to, half-expecting that I would be shot when someone took a break from openly having sex and doing drugs in the hallway between classes, etc.)

Though I am far from an expert in the Emergent Church movement, from my interactions with them, they seem like a kind of variation on the theme. One impulse behind the Emergent Church is to explicitly de-emphasize the importance of orthodox belief, to make doubt an integral part of people’s spiritual life, and so forth. Yet their practices of emotional manipulation seem to be essentially unchanged. The difference from the traditional church is quantitative, not qualitative — they are more opportunistic in providing people with rationales for staying loyal to their Christian identity (doubt is a bonus, not an obstacle! you can drink craft beers! we don’t openly hate homosexuals!), but in the end, the goal is to maintain group identity by any means necessary. As we’ve seen in recent online controversies, one important strategy is to occlude real-life divisions in the hope of including everyone. They embrace diversity, for instance, by being open to the concerns of LGBT people and providing space for those who hate and deride them. They push for group unity by castigating people who introduce division by suggesting that LGBT people might not want to be in community people who hate them — a common strategy for taming the oppressed in the history of Christianity, this time advanced under the cover of “open dialogue.”

In the end, the goal is to get people to embrace Christian identity simply for its own sake — with no regard to whether the community is damaging to them. Emergent types are more slippery than most Christians, essentially going along with anything anyone says so long as it will increase their willingness to maintain some kind of Christian identity. I once had a conversation with a “cool youth pastor,” for instance, who listened to Wilco and drank beer and wasn’t a dick about his beliefs. No matter what I said, he insisted that we fundamentally agreed. Even when I said that his work was actively destructive insofar as he was convincing young people to stay affiliated with an institution that was hurting them and was going to hurt their children as well, he nodded along, sure that our disagreement was more or less semantic. There was room for me and my opinions in the church! Indeed, they would be so much better for having my dissenting voice to keep them honest! I feel similarly whenever I interact with Pete Rollins — it’s frustrating that he always insists that he’s open to every critique and really respects dissenting opinions and is incredibly enriched by them, etc. However distant he gets from the institutional church, he’s still deeply Christian in form, and the opportunistic openness that he has embraced as his way of distancing himself from Christianity is the most Christian thing about him.

When I was in seminary, I was sometimes aggravated by liberal Christians’ discomfort with Christian identity and their unwillingness to actively reclaim Christianity and the Bible over against the fundamentalists. I still think that those types of fights are strategically valuable, but I’ve come to a deeper appreciation of liberal inauthenticity over the years. Every attempt to reclaim Christian identity, even with good reasons and for good ends, always threatens to become an attempt to vindicate the master-signifier of Christianity, to elevate it above all other struggles and forms of identity (which are always produced out of some struggle and are always continually engaged in struggle).

Many people have claimed that the New Atheists are “just as bad” as fundamentalists due to their insistence on their (lack of) beliefs. I think that this discussion allows us to make a similar claim from another direction — they are still “Christian” in form insofar as they elevate atheism as their master-signifier. I had a Twitter argument with one seemingly good-natured New Atheist who was appalled that I painted the whole group with the brush of Dawkins’ racist imperialism. It gradually became clear that he was a kind of “Emergent” New Atheist, trying to leave things open so that everyone had a seat at the table (i.e., everyone could be identified with New Atheism). While it was disturbing to him that New Atheists could hold such reprehensible views, the important thing was to maintain the unity of the group by downplaying any struggle or division that might arise from the slippage between “secular reason” and anti-Islamic sentiment. And in fact, we can often see the same kinds of emotional manipulation at work among New Atheists — while I was mocking the New Atheism on Twitter, dozens of people tried to shame me as a kind of “reverse racist” or for being “just as bad” as people who stereotype Muslims. It’s structurally identical to how Emergents and other Christians weaponize liberal values like open dialogue to shame their critics.

What’s the solution to this? I don’t know for sure, but I can at least describe where I’ve arrived for the moment. More and more, I’ve been drawn to claim that I’m in some way “Christian” (as an adjective, a cultural description) — who could deny it, after all the forces that have shaped me and all the things I’ve actively chosen to study and stake my career on — but I’m not “a Christian” (as a noun). This could be viewed as a kind of reprise of the strategy of another group of Christians castigated as “inauthentic” by Evangelicals: Catholics who continue to describe themselves as “Catholic” (usually only in adjective form) even though they rarely practice and keep their distance from the official Church organization.

This kind of inauthenticity is an attempt to deactivate Christianity as a master signifier — I do not identify directly with it (as “a Christian”), nor do I define myself over against it. It’s part of the material of my life, which I can put to use as I choose. I make no effort to vindicate the “true” Christianity that finally disproves the slander of the fundamentalists who falsely claim the name. Let them claim the name. The name is not my concern. Other struggles are more important to me than the struggle over that particular name.