Phenomenal Realism Again

Once again, thinking out loud.

Consider the Platonic theory of participation of matter in form.

It's erotic causality, not efficient.  Material things desire eternity, and any material thing gains its formal qualities per its desire for a form, while the form remains unmoved.  However, this remains a one-way causality.

The reality of quality works similar to this way.  To halt the infinite regress of nominalism, I argue that universals are real but non-existent, and they become instantiated through particular interactions.  The "universals" in this sense can be understood as principles of unity that are on the border of the intelligible (=generic or specific unity), and any determinate existence invokes a specific unity that we may categorize as one of these universals.  This approach solves the logical problem, although it is counter-intuitive.

The ultimate structure of unity is the cosmic and existential limitation on possibility.  That is, what is the structure of possibility qua possibility.  This is not to ask what is possible, mere possibility to be this or that.  Rather, it is to ask about the structural relations of possibilities.  That is, what is the possibility of this relating to that, and what are the possible relations?  This is an abstract discussion whose first level of concretion is when we say "potentiality" rather than "possibility."  Possibilities are logico-mathematical realities, whereas potentialities are existent possibilities.  Not all real things are existent, and existence constrains possibilities to the condition of particular existence or existence more generally.

Let us tweak the strict Plato model a little more.  What if the forms slowly evolve over cosmic time-scales?  Then we get much closer to the standard  process-metaphysical view of the "laws of nature" that govern the interaction of things such that they come into unity.  Coming into unity is to have determinate possibilities rather than the raw flux of chance.  Mathematics is a particular determination of pure possibility that becomes determined once we choose its axioms.  Existence is another order of determination, although online mathematics, it cannot be rid of pure chance.  It scarifies the pure crystal clarity of mere reality for the existential possibilities that in concreto become potentialities.  ("Existential possibility" is the ontological term, whereas "potentiality" is the ontic; the latter presumes determinate laws of nature.)

Were we not to talk of the reality of quality?  Real quality is just a unity that may be achieved through particular interactions.  Insomuch as a unity is a determinate structure of possibility, it has a reality separate from any particular existence.  Existence longs for unity as matter strives for form, though the potentialities for any particular unity is limited by nature.

What do we have here?  A realist re-description of nature that explains the reality of phenomenal qualities.  Ok, "hints" rather than "explains," but I have just unburied myself from my workload for a moment....

CFP The Pluralist

The Pluralist is the official journal of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy

The Pluralist provides a publication venue for excellent scholarship in

philosophy that will be of interest to our readers. We invite submissions

of work related to American philosophy and pragmatism, but not limited to

those areas.  All submissions are blind reviewed by multiple reviewers. The

journal also invites suggestions for themed issues or special emphases.

 Please direct inquiries to Roger Ward atroger_ward@georgetowncollege.edu.

thanks,

Roger Ward, Editor

CFP European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy

European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 1/2013

Call for papers Pragmatism and creativity

Edited by Giovanni Maddalena (University of Molise, Italy) and Fernando Zalamea (National University, Colombia)

The creative process is immensely important for any inquiry. In the sciences perspective it functions in the path of discovery, decisive in selecting a new hypothesis. In the arts, creativity's pivotal role  is evident. But in our everyday experience, as Dewey pointed out, creativity is what describes our best acts in social relationships, in education, and in jobs of every kind. The web of images, languages and actions bends itself through the continuous insertion of new, creative, information. There can be creativity also in habitual works, where creativity is crucial for enhancing real satisfaction.

Philosophers often pigeon-hole creativity in the aesthetic or psychological realms. Classic Pragmatists tended toward a more comprehensive pattern of reasoning in which creativity could enter. From Peirce’s abduction to Mead’s relationship between Self and I, pragmatists contemplated a series of different and often problematic views of creativity. Certainly, they stressed the importance of creative processes in different aspects of life, abolishing the gap between scientific and non-scientific realms. Their anti-dualist attitude forbid any pigeon-holing, but their positive answer to the dilemma of what creativity is, and what its fields and boundaries are, remained quite obscure.

This issue of the European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy wants to investigate the perspectives that pragmatisms, old and new, opens up on creativity. We will welcome any contribution on this topic that will (i) clarify classic or neo pragmatists thought on creativity, or (ii) use pragmatist insights in other disciplines, particularly in mathematics and sciences, or (iii) compare pragmatist views with authors and perspectives belonging to other philosophical streams, or (iv) propose new theories inspired by pragmatism. Contributions related to the dialectics between plastic reason and exact imagination, closer to Peirce's pragmaticism and oriented to an understanding of multilayered creativity, will be considered of central interest.

Papers should be sent to Marco Stango (marcostango@alice.it) before November 1st 2012. Papers should not exceed 7,000 words and must include an abstract of 200-400 words and a list of works cited. Papers will be selected on the basis of a process of blind review. Acceptance of papers will be determined before February 1st, 2013. Papers will be published on July 1st, 2013.

My Response to Larval Subjects on Realist Phenomenology

Levi is late in allowing my moderated comments on his Derrida thread.  He challenged me to give an argument for what I claimed. I began to do so, although I figured that he already knew the answer since he claims knowledge of Whitehead.  I just assumed I was being pedantic, but apparently I was not.  My post is still not posted after several days.

***********

Levi,

This fact [that I am using a different definition of "phenomenology"] is clear to me, and I stress it to help bridge some OOO vs. SR-PR divides.  If nothing else, I hope this point helps, because Leon, Adam, Matt, probably Shaviro, etc. are coming from (or including) a tradition that uses some of the same words as the Husserlian tradition.  This is an exercise in cross-tradition communication.

"The" phenomenological tradition is bigger than Husserl et al; recall that Husserl cites William James, who was part of the pragmatist tradition that was already doing a "phenomenology" that C.S. Peirce called "phaneroscopy."  Whitehead comes out of that tradition, and trying to read him from the Husserlian tradition will lead to terrible misunderstandings.

I'm not talking about intentionality as understood in the Husserlian tradition, and the corresponding concept is not correlationist.  Since there is not strict "intentionality" in this view, I have nothing to defend from your critique; you presume a concept that I do not hold.

As for your last point, I prefer Peirce's response in his encyclopedia article on Berkeley.  In short, do we take phenomenal qualities to be real or "just names" as nominalists would insist?  If we treat "green" as an arbitrary "product," then we accept nominalism: there is no unity in what generates sense experience that leads to the conception of "green."  I insist that's an arbitrary decision [that does not advance beyond Locke].  Following Peirce, if we agree that there is a existent independent of thought, something real, then "green" means that element of the existent [(a potency)] that tends to constrain thought to the [phenomenal] qualia "green," which it is capable of doing regardless whether there is anyone there to experience green.  As before, "green" as an actualized potency is an event of the interaction of the thing and entities capable of experiencing the qualia "green."  Otherwise, strictly speaking, "green" would be a "general" and not a "universal."  This view also shuns any notion of a "thing in itself."  There is something like withdrawal, but its an characteristic of temporality.  I could go on, but I should defer to proper Peirce scholars; Whiteheads notion is derivative of this and I leave his scholars to explain further.

[In addition, please see other posts on this site to see what a "potency" or power is; it's not anything obvious or like Aristotle.

I would add a counter-argument to Levi's green example.  If we define "green" as the product of properties of the object, e.g., green leaves of a plant, then we just re-inscribe the question.  So, how do we know those properties?  We leave ourselves right back where we began, only now we're talking about "Chlorophyll"--what is that a product of?  Ad infinitum  Is there anything real at the bottom of that?  Why set ourselves up to ask that correlationist question?  We cannot we say that green is real and not a product?  Why--because the nominalist majority does not like talking about phenomenal qualities being real, i.e., there being whiteness in addition to white things.  At worse, the view is on par with nominalism as arbitrariness goes.]

What You Are Missing Out On

A thought.

My regular readers can request to friend my on Facebook as "Jason Hills."  I make a lot less formal commentary there, but also post a lot of news, make philosophical commentary, and happen to be friends with a sizeable chunk of the SAAP pragmatist community.

If I'm quiet here, I'm much, much less quiet there.

CFP: New Mexico-West Texas Philosophical Society

New Mexico-West Texas Philosophical Society

Papers on any serious philosophical subject are invited for the 63rd

annual conference of the New Mexico West Texas Philosophical Society

to be held in Las Cruces, New Mexico March 23 – March 25, 2012. The

deadline for paper submissions is January15, 2012. Please consult the

society’s website at www.nmwt.org. To be considered for presentation,

papers approximately 3,000 words long should be submitted

electronically (as a Word attachment) and presentable within 25

minutes. There will be comments on every paper. If you would like to

be considered for making comments on a paper, please contact the

Secretary with your name, title, institution, AOS, and AOC. To be

considered for publication in Southwest Philosophical Studies, papers

must be no more than 3,000 words plus endnotes using only MLA

formatting. Each paper (regular conference or for possible

publication) should be prepared for blind refereeing.

•       Please send an electronic version (Word document) of papers to Dan

Flores, Secretary, at secretary.nmwt@gmail.com.

The conference will be held at Hotel Encanto de Las Cruces located at

705 South Telshor Blvd Las Cruces, NM 88011 (Phone: 575-522-4300 or

1-866-383-0443). For those who wish to stay at the hotel, rooms are

$93.00 (single and double) plus tax. Try to make reservations before

Friday, March 9, 2012 to ensure the $93.00 rate and mention that you

are a member of NMWT. Please check the Society’s website and your e-

mail accounts for any updates. www.nmwt.org

Registration and Fees

1. full-time professors: $70;

2. part-time professors and adjuncts: $45;

3. graduate students: $35;

4. undergraduate students: $25;

5. observers not on the program: free.

•       Checks should be made out to: New Mexico West Texas Philosophical

Society

•       Please send registration fees to:

Robert M. Louis, Treasurer

New Mexico-West Texas Philosophical Society

5810 Creston Springs Court

Spring, Texas  77379-8742

treasurer.nmwt@gmail.com (slow service)

Wolrml@aol.com (fast service)

Awards

The New Mexico-West Texas Philosophical Society awards two prizes: (1)

the Hubert Griggs Alexander Memorial Award for an excellent paper by a

philosopher at any career level, on any philosophical topic, but

especially on aesthetics, philosophy of language, symbolic form,

Hispanic philosophy, classical philosophy, or the role of philosophy

in the humanities; and (2) the Houghton Dalrymple Memorial Award for

an excellent paper by a graduate student or recent Ph.D. on any

philosophical topic, but with a preference for papers on epistemology

or Hume. Each award includes a check for $100.00 and publication in

Southwest Philosophical Studies. Those wishing to be considered for

either of these awards should put “Alexander” or “Dalrymple”in the

subject line of their e-mail message and include a CV with their

submission.

What Traditional Vocabulary Do You Teach?

I just realized that, although I work primarily in the traditions of pragmatism and continental, I teach in an analytic vocabulary.  I think that is amusing, because its an unintuitive way to break-down traditional barriers.  Breaking down barriers is not the same as breaking traditions; it is being neighborly rather than hostile.  I do this not by accident; I honestly think that analytic terms are easier to grasp on the face of it.  However, as I would complain if you asked, they are no different from continental or pragmatist terms in assuming a specific background by which they foreground their taken meaning.

I teach most introductory courses in a historical format.  Of course, I introduce and insist upon the historic terms, but I also introduce contemporary terms in my commentary, e.g., the "this is what this is about."  (The distinction between historical perspective and explicit retrospective is a concept for a higher-level course, in which the distinction between historic and contemporary terms would be more significant.)

Does anyone else notice such tradition-shifting between their research and teaching, or between teaching different subjects in their own practice?  In the future, I would love to teach upper-division or graduate courses where we would address issues "bi-lingually" in two traditions' vocabularies.  The very first course I would like to do that in would be on phenomenal qualities ... because that's where my research is going.  I'll keep dreaming that I'd ever get such a position, as the market looks so terrible.