There, he claims that “the differend between Kant and Hegel is still crucial” even for speculative realists. I agree with the notion, though I note that it can be expressed in other ways. my favorite part is:
“Or else, as I prefer — following Whitehead as I understand him — we can invert the order of the Critiques so that the 3rd critique comes first — becoming, as Whitehead put it, a critique of feeling, which makes the other critiques unnecessary — that is to say, aesthetics precedes cognition — we affect and are affected by other things aesthetically before we cognize those other things, and even (or especially) when we cannot cognize them adequately. We cannot *know* things in themselves, or things apart from their correlation with us; but we can, as Harman rightly suggests, allude to them, i.e. refer to them metaphorically or indirectly. And we can, as well, be aesthetically *moved* by them — indeed, this is the primordial mode ofactual contact among entities (and in saying this, I am espousing a Whiteheadian version of SR which differs from Harman’s object-oriented ontology).”
The idea that the “aesthetic precedes cognition” is not new with Whitehead, and I believe that Shaviro knows that. Arguably, it was not new with Kant, as he does treat of aesthetics as order in the first Critique. However, Shaviro is right in that it is the third Critique that treats of purposes in nature. Regardless, the notion goes at least as far back as the romantics.
I have posted previously, however, about the danger that this model exposes. If aesthetics precedes cognition, then what is the relation of morality to aesthetics? Many contemporaries aestheticize morality, and I see this as necessary on this view, although how morality is aestheticized is crucial to avoid adopting a Humean view … unless that is one’s intent all-along. In that case I would disagree. More on that later, though for specifics I would direct inquirers to my Transactions article.