By good fortune, I recently became acquainted with Ms. Pittet through Academia.edu, who is working on Deleuze in conversation with both contemporary French and classical pragmatist/Americanist thought. I found it especially interesting since it is pro-pragmatist/Americanist and contra Meillassoux. While I can speak for the pragmatist side, I let it to my readers whom I know to be more familiar with Meillassoux. After some conversation, she agreed to send the English-language abstract of what is roughly a master's thesis (Masters 2/Bac+5)--the educational levels of the US system are not equivalent after high school. I invite her and the readers to discuss this, knowing that Deleuze, Meillassoux, and process metaphysics are of high interest. Below is her translation, and you should feel free to converse in English or French, although my grasp of l'argot is limited.
Empiricism and metaphysics in the work of Gilles Deleuze:
A semiotics of Idea
The aim of my work is to consider the renewal of metaphysics in particular through the work of Gilles Deleuze. The main contribution of my memory is to show that the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze is not an overflow or a deconstruction of metaphysics, or a new form of Platonism, but a renewal of metaphysics by American and English empiricism. We support that the metaphysics of Deleuze opens a third way or a new challenge for contemporary metaphysics: this metaphysics is neither a "multiple Platonism" could defend it Alain Badiou, nor a scientific metaphysics or an overflow of the Kantian criticism as argues Claudine Tiercelin. In reality, the metaphysical issue of Gilles Deleuze is less the return of the absolute both Platonic and Kantian than a discovery of a new form of metaphysical absolute, absolute immanent, empirical and concrete. Unlike Quentin Meillassoux, we do not believe that the current metaphysical issue was taking place in a possible return to the absolute, considered a limit by "corélationnistes" philosophies, but in the reform of the absolute paradigm, reform undertaken by the English empiricist and Americans such as Whitehead, Peirce and William James. Our work is positioned against two interpretations of the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze: an anti-metaphysician interpretation and an interpretation that aims to make the metaphysics of Deleuze a “conversly” of Platonism.
If there is a metaphysical absolute in the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, Deleuze calls "Idea". But we will show that this "Idea" is a reversal of the metaphysical idealism (Platonic and German idealism) by what Deleuze calls, like Jean Wahl, a "transcendental empiricism" and inherits from the English idealism especially Peirce and Whitehead. The main thesis of our work is to show that the concept of “transcendental empiricism” implies a reversal of metaphysical idealism that we will try to trace the history from Plato to Kant, and that inherits especially of the semiotics of Peirce and Whitehead’s idealism. Idea is not an essence or substance, but a concrete and cosmological entity that requires two types of processes or experiences for its construction: a mental process because Idea is considered "differential" of the thinking, and a semiotic processes since each empirical sign suggests and envelopes an Idea. We will establish a classification of all of the signs which suggest, in other words a semiotics of Idea.