Graham Harman, on Object-Oriented Ontology, writes,
"You can take the other path, of course. This is done most bluntly by Bergson in Matter and Memory and James in Essays in Radical Empiricism (I just wrote a critique of the latter book at the request of Kronos, though it will only be in Polish translation initially). Bergson's "images" and James's "experiences" are designed to circumvent the whole problem by eliding the difference between image and reality from the start. However, their arguments for this aren't very good, and succeed only if you share their distaste for the phenomenal/noumenal distinction."
I am less familiar with Bergson, but I can definitely speak for James, especially as he is taken here as the "other path" that culminates in the pragmatist tradition although Harman did not mention that. I would like to see his argument. So far, I would repeat Harman's own words used earlier in the post to defend his concept of "allure;" "I’ve not heard any objections to it that amount to anything more than personal distaste." His description of it as a "distaste for the phenomenal/noumenal distinction" is not wholly inaccurate, but the majority of philosophers are likely to misinterpret pragmatism by thinking its a Lockean empiricism, e.g., either that we are dancing the correlationist tango, or are getting around the problem by "eliding the difference between image and reality from the start." Again, that is not strictly false, but without a background in pragmatism, the average reader is very likely to read that in the customary way given to us by modern philosophy. One then misunderstands and misinterprets the tradition. Or, to give Harman more credit, perhaps he has grasped one of James' weaknesses, as many of James' arguments "aren't very good" but not for the reasons mentioned. They are not very good because James was more a visionary in his later work than a careful, systematic thinker. He relied heavily on C.S. Peirce, who was everything James and Dewey were not in this regard, and many misread both of them because they do not have this background.
In closing, I do hope that the translation will come out soon, as I am curious how James was read, especially since this can be dicey at times even among the James scholars when consulting his later work.
p.s. I could not help but be drawn in as pragmatism phenomenology and theory of representation is what I do, and James is hard to pin down definitely on these subjects, and thus I am curious how Harman does so. James' theory of truth, that also informs his theory of experience, is a derivation of Peirce's "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" and the notion of "abduction," the logic of science.