If you cannot imagine it, then you cannot consciously experience it as meaningful.
It seems simple, but one you parse what a Deweyan pragmatist means by "imagine," "conscious," "experience," and "meaningful," it's as far from obvious as you can get.
If I were to add some assumptions, it would read:
Since consciously apprehended meaning arises from the imaginative projection of anticipated consequences, then if you cannot ....
If I were to explain what meaning is and how it is projected, it would read:
Since meaning arises from the habitual association of qualitative experience with remembered enactions of that experience, and since .... (continuing with the previous qualification).
Finally for this teaser, I would add that "experience" is the interaction of body and environment, i.e., the local temporal-spatial field of interactivity, and thus the "remembered enactions of experience" is actually a description of the behavioral patterns of a local environment inclusive of a human being....
For those who haven't heard me say it before--or read it--the point is that I'm working on a realist, pragmatist phenomenology that is also processional. The "integral ecology" and OOO folks who like their flat ontologies may note that the only privilege given to human being is that it is the focal point of experience only because I'm interested in human conscious experience. It I were interested in bare human experience, I could write a "phenomenology" of my shoes. The difference would be that the shoes as a "body" do not experience (its) potentiality as qualitative. Experience is modal, and not all things are capable of all modes, including humanity.