This is the introduction to a conference paper that I will be giving at the New Mexico-West Texas conference this weekend.
Scott Aikin in his 2006 article,
"Pragmatism, Naturalism, and Phenomenology" argues that pragmatism
and phenomenology are incompatible. Pragmatic
naturalism is incompatible with phenomenology's anti-naturalism. Therefore, pragmatists trying to appropriate insights
from phenomenology encounter a dilemma: either reject naturalism and thereby
pragmatism, or reject anti-naturalism and thereby phenomenology. Aikin names a list of pragmatists faced with
this dilemma: Bruce Wilshire, Sandra Rosenthal, Victor Kestenbaum, Vincent
Colapietro, Philip Bourgeois, Shannon Sullivan, and others. Aikin has thrown down the gauntlet.
I will argue that Aikin's dilemma is
unmerited, because he has misidentified its horns. It will require no subtlety and few words to
establish this. Given his definition of
naturalism, all of the classical pragmatists are neither naturalists nor
pragmatists. Moreover, most discussion
of "phenomenology" misconstrues phenomenological method as subjective
self-reporting. The term "phenomenology"
in his usage refers to a narrow reading of Husserl and not pre- or
post-Husserlian phenomenology. As
stated, the two horns of Aikin's dilemma are neither classical pragmatism nor
phenomenology, but scientific naturalism and subjectivism.
There are antipathies between classical
pragmatism's naturalism and classical Continental phenomenology, but I
will argue that they do not proscribe pragmatic appropriation of phenomenology
in general. In the conclusion, I will
argue for phenomenologically-informed pragmatism, and will discuss one barrier
to the appropriation of classical Continental phenomenology, the
principle of continuity.
Looks good. I want to think about this in the future too. Send the paper if you have a chance.
ReplyDeleteLeon/after nature
good luck, will be interested in hearing about the responses and how your paper differs from the earlier works gathered in Corrington's "Pragmatism Considers Phenomenology"
ReplyDelete-dmf
DMF,
ReplyDeleteI have read that book, and I generally agree with the Husserlian commentator that the authors in that work do not touch Husserl in their critiques because they are poorly aimed and informed. I do not find that work to be very helpful on the subject. I much prefer other sources.
In truth, the paper is a political piece. It establishes two points. One, pragmatism and phenomenology (Husserlian or otherwise) are compatible and have always been such. Saying otherwise only demonstrates either a lack of knowledge or, in the case of Aikin, contrary political aims--there's a lot of back-story on this. There might be other reasons, but these two are my focus. Two, I have been insisting upon the necessity of phenomenological work in Dewey scholarship and similar pragmatic work for years, because pragmatism far too easily leads to all the blindnesses and follies that post-Husserlian phenomenology critiques. This is not a new point in such scholarship, but it is strongly resisted or acknowledged and then dodged. I do not engage in these political points in the paper itself, btw, but just concern myself with a scholarly counter-argument; I am explaining the context and motivation for writing it.
p.s.
ReplyDeleteI do find the articles in that book interesting, thought not sufficiently substantial. Their critique of Husserl is not the reason to read them. There are many other sources for phenomenology and pragmatism written from the pragmatic viewpoint. This last caveat is necessary, because there are *many* such articles and books written from a continental or analytic viewpoint.
As for what I have to say, I would just have to send copies of my articles, or if you wish, start up a blogpost discussion of it. I would be more than happy to do so.