I believe that I have sufficiently addressed realism and nominalism to broach my next post on the multiple relation of experience-and-world. This is where the discussion is headed, for me. How can I say that the experience-world relation is a many-to-many relation and maintain realism? "Realism" usually means that the world exists independently of human thought, is a unity such that an idea might "correspond" to an object in the world, and that the correspondence relation is at least many-to-one (many perspectives on one object). I will argue that the world is a multitude in its unity, which is not a novel thesis I'll admit, although I might give a novel articulation of it. I will argue for a realism that does not require the idempotent unity of the world.
What is really going one, behind all the fancy words? I will be arguing against Lockean empiricisms, by which I mean much more than Locke himself but also all forms of derived empiricisms, and I will be arguing for Hegelian empiricisms, wherein relations are real and the mediated immediacy of the phenomenon is not a copy, correlate, or mirror of nature. It is better understood as a real emenation of nature.
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