tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1247368540862329841.post4575351964105491736..comments2023-06-07T08:50:33.280-05:00Comments on Immanent Transcendence: Universals vs. Genera vs. Generals in Realism vs. Nominalismkhadimirhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12960757465883819380noreply@blogger.comBlogger4125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1247368540862329841.post-63347932045025849662011-12-10T16:37:02.283-06:002011-12-10T16:37:02.283-06:00counter to someone playing devil's advocate.
...counter to someone playing devil's advocate.<br /><br />I never said that the speculative deduction was in any way limited by human being. I did imply that something must have made us think about the topic, which is trivially true. Rather, I insist that someone offer their criteria for making the abductive-deduction. That way we can evaluate between speculative views.khadimirhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12960757465883819380noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1247368540862329841.post-84918733484277456172011-12-10T15:56:54.250-06:002011-12-10T15:56:54.250-06:00Addendum to above.
It would be far too easy to co...Addendum to above.<br /><br />It would be far too easy to counter what I say by claiming that I am a correlationist who is is trying to shut people down by asking "how can you know?" in the usual post-Kantian way. Rather, I only insist *that* one could know in principle, but I do not insist that one demonstrate how.<br /><br />That's the difference between a Kantian transcendental deduction and an abduction; the former is a special kind of deduction, while the latter is an induction followed by a speculative deduction per contemporary formal logic. In sum transcendental arguments are not necessarily the same as abductive arguments.<br /><br />One might say, loosely, that we induce from sensation to perception, and then speculatively deduce from perception to interact with the world to investigate that perception.khadimirhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12960757465883819380noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1247368540862329841.post-21100103218259474222011-12-10T15:07:22.398-06:002011-12-10T15:07:22.398-06:00I would to add a follow-up lest I be named a corre...I would to add a follow-up lest I be named a correlationist. The very first counter I expect to what I've said is that I'm regressing into a "philosophy of access." False. There is a difference between restricting what can be said to *how* we can know it in advance, and insisting that explanation is in principle possible although not requiring it in advance. I affirm the latter but not the former. Else, what good is the principle of sufficient reason other than to reject ex nihilo causation, etc.?<br /><br />A nominalist that refuses to accept anything other than particulars and generals cannot say anything concerning the passing present, or perhaps present as past, as Leon notes. Such a thinker would have a hard time discussing the future except through induction, but then must find a way to circumvent the inductive fallacy of Hume--that we can never presume that the future will be like the past. Much of this can still be circumvented, I believe, by pragmatic or abductive procedures, but the result will be very limited. I cannot in abstract say how limited; we would have to discuss the work of particular thinkers.<br /><br />In sum, I am not arguing for correlationism qua frisking interlocutors for how they "access" what they claim in advance.khadimirhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12960757465883819380noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1247368540862329841.post-55565352440144959542011-12-09T14:33:15.669-06:002011-12-09T14:33:15.669-06:00p.s. a real universal would be a constraint on ge...p.s. a real universal would be a constraint on generals. E.g., "red" refers not to an arbitrary particular given a name, but something that exists in reality independent of any naming, reference, etc.khadimirhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12960757465883819380noreply@blogger.com